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Best Phantom Forces Script 2024 – Silent Aim, Unlock Guns

Aaqib Javed

Welcome to our Phantom Forces Script Wiki Guide. If you’re looking for a free Phantom Forces Script Pastebin, you’ve come to the perfect place. We provide a variety of Roblox Scripts and, as well as other freebies in Roblox.

If you’re looking for more scripts, check out our Arm Wrestling Simulator Scripts and Type Soul Scripts articles. You can also dive into our Roblox Script Database  where you will find scripts for many roblox games.

Script Phantom Forces

loadstring(game:HttpGet(“https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Amenteso/robloxscripts/main/Key.lua”,true))()

Phantom Forces Script Pastebin 2023

loadstring(game:HttpGet(“https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kaidacoder/Scriptdetection/main/Scriptsearcher.lua”))()
loadstring(game:HttpGet(“https://raw.githubusercontent.com/slowpii/Phantom-Forces/main/Esp-Aimbot”))()

Phantom Forces Script 2023 Aimbot, Silent Aim, Esp

loadstring(game:HttpGet(“https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder026jb/phantom_force_aimbot/main/aimbot.lua”))()

1. Free Phantom Forces Esp, Wall Check, Keybinds Scripts Pastebin

Here is the script for Autofarm, Just copy and paste them to your executor:

2. Free Phantom Forces Wallbang, FOV Scripts Pastebin

Here is the script for Skip Round, Just copy and paste them to your executor:

3. Working Phantom Forces ESP, Aimbot Scripts Pastebin

Roblox phantom forces script pastebin faqs.

Here are some basic questions related to Roblox Scripts.

Is It Safe to Use Roblox Script?

Yes, the Script for Phantom Forces is completely safe to use if you download or copy it from our website.

If you download this Roblox script from a random website, you risk losing your Roblox account.

To avoid any kind of loss, use a fresh account while executing the script.

How to run a script in Roblox?

If you don’t know how to use and Execute the script below here is what you have to do

Pick an exploit that will help you to execute the script

Download the exploit you chouse

Now Open that exploit

When you open the game press Inject or Attach

Paste the Phantom Forces Script in the script section

Press Execute

Recommended Exploits

To execute the scripts in Phantom Forces, you need an exploit or an executor as we said above and Below you can find all the. list of the most recommended executors or exploits for Roblox scripts:

Krnl Executor

JJ Spoilt Executor

Arceus X Executor

Evon Executor

Fluxus Executor

Delta Executor

Ducky Sploit Executor

That’s it, you can enjoy the Phantom Forces Script.

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Best Phantom Forces Scripts (January 2024) – Aimbot, Wall Hack, And More

Here's a guide on the best Phantom Forces scripts and how to use them.

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Phantom Forces is an intense FPS game, so it’s understandable if you are looking for scripts to cheat and level up. Using these cheats, you can enable Aimbot, Wallhack, Auto Stab, and much more. Using these cheats, you can easily level up and unlock new weapons and attachments. As this game can be tough for new players, these cheats will help you get a jump start and catch up to other players.

Table of Contents

Phantom Forces Scripts January (2024)

Wall Hack Script in Roblox Phantom Forces

Here are all the latest, working, and active scripts you can use to cheat. You can find these at RBX Scripts and Roblox Scripts.

Script 1 – Wall Check

This script will allow you to see the opponents through the wall.

Script 2 – Hitbox Expander

This will expand your hitbox and increase the chance of hitting your opponent.

Script 3 – Anti Aim

This will flip your hitbox so your head is at the feet and vice versa.

Script 4 – Bunny Hop

This will allow you to do the Bunny Hop easily.

Script 5 – Auto Stab

With this, your Auto Stab will be enabled, increasing your melee kills.

Script 6 – Third Person

With this, you can play in third-person mode.

Script 7 – Radar Hack

The radar will show the position of your enemies.

Script 8 – Movement Changer

Your movement can be modified.

Script 9 – Fast Animations

The reload and gun change animations will be faster.

Script 10 – Silent Aim V2

With this, you can easily kill enemies without looking at them.

How to Execute Phantom Forces Scripts?

Use Roblox Executor to use Scripts

To use scripts, you’ll need Roblox Executor software on your device. Since there are many of them in the market, you can go through our Best Roblox Executors guide to get the best one for yourself. Once you have this software, follow these simple steps to execute the scripts:

  • Download any Script using the links.
  • Open the downloaded file and copy the script.
  • Launch your Roblox Executor and paste it.
  • Hit “Execute” and launch the game.

Are Roblox Script Executors Safe to Use?

Note that adding scripts to cheat in any Roblox game is a bannable offense. If you are caught using any Roblox exploit then it can result in a temporary or permanent ban. So, we recommend using these cheats at your own risk . Moreover, we do not endorse any exploits or Executors. If you are still planning to use these scripts, then we recommend you use them on a new account.

That’s all from us on all Phantom Forces Scripts and how to execute them. For more helpful guides, you can visit our Roblox guides section.

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CWP4

Phantom Forces Aimbot Script

  • loadstring(game:HttpGet("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BigMaX-PF/PhantomNuker/main/Phantom%20Nuker", true))()
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  • Untitled Python | 43 min ago | 0.46 KB
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phantom forces aimbot pastebin 2023

Phantom Forces Script 2024 – ESP, Aimbot & More

Sourabh yadav.

  • January 18, 2024

Featured image of Roblox Phantom Forces script

Hello everyone. Are you looking for the most up-to-date Phantom Forces script? If that’s the case, you’ve come to the right place.

Today, I’m going to share the Roblox Phantom Forces script pastebin hacks, which can be used to get features like aimbot, ESP, fast reload, and more!

StyLiS Studios created Phantom Forces , a Roblox-based game. It is a first-person shooter game similar to CS:GO and many other well-known games.

To win the round, you must defeat the opposing team. This game includes modern weapons, military equipment, and much more. Phantom Forces’ graphics and sound are about as good as we can expect from a Roblox-based game.

Players in this game can choose between four different class roles to engage in gunfights and melee fights. Because the game is fast-paced, the controls are difficult to master, and we need scripts and hacks to assist us.

So, to address that issue, I’m sharing the Phantom Forces script, which works perfectly. It has infinite ammo, no reload, ESP, aimbot, and many other features.

If you enjoyed the Phantom Forces script, we have shared a number of other Roblox scripts that you might enjoy.

All Roblox Phantom Forces Script

Phantom Forces scripts are lua-coded scripts that can be combined with a Roblox script executor to gain an unfair advantage in the game. These scripts include features that allow gamers to easily defeat their opponents.

Aimbot is a popular cheat in first-person shooter games because it allows you to lock the aim at the enemy. This cheat allows you to kill enemies more quickly. Aimbot is a great benefit or feature available in the Phantom Forces script.

Another popular hack is ESP, which is primarily used to determine the location of enemies in the game. With the help of this phantom forces hack, you can easily locate your enemies.

3. No Reload

When the magazine is empty, you can reload your weapon immediately. You are not required to wait for the reloading time. Because of this phantom forces cheat, you only need to keep your finger on the trigger and keep firing bullets; you don’t need to worry about reloading.

4. No Recoil

The majority of us are unable to control the recoil of the guns in the game. Sometimes it’s because we’re not very good at controlling it, and other times it’s because of guns. However, no recoil feature of the Roblox phantom forces script allows you to control or reduce the recoil of the gun to zero.

5. Firerate

With the help of this cheat, you can change the firing speed of the gun. It allows you to alter the game’s fire rate. It is simple to use; simply increase the value to the maximum.

6. Headshot

The script’s Headshot feature is fantastic for phantom forces. As a result, you can only kill your opponents by headshot. As a result, it shifts your firing aim to the head, resulting in a proper headshot.

Script #1 – Auto Farm

Script #2 – aimbot & esp, how to execute phantom forces script.

Image of Phantom Forces script gameplay

To use the Phantom Forces script you need a reliable Roblox script executor, you can get that from our website. Now assuming that you have one, we can proceed to instructions.

  • First, copy the Roblox Phantom Forces script from above.
  • Now, launch the game on your device, alongside the Roblox script executor.
  • Once the game is opened, switch to the executor.
  • Paste the script that you have copied from this page.
  • Now, click on “Attach/Inject” and then “Execute” to load the script GUI.
  • Once the GUI of the Phantom Forces script appears, choose your desired hacks and have fun.

That all you need to do to use the Phantom Forces script. If you have doubts regarding the script please consider FAQs and if they are still unanswered then let me know in the comments and I would be happy to assist.

Finally, the Roblox Phantom Forces script is an excellent tool for players seeking an unfair advantage over their opponents.

It has features like aimbot, ESP, no reload, no recoil, firerate, and headshot that can help players easily defeat their enemies.

It is important to note, however, that using scripts to gain an unfair advantage is against the game’s terms of service and may result in account bans or suspensions. As a result, use scripts at your own risk.

What is Phantom Forces?

Phantom Forces is a first-person shooter game on Roblox, created by StyLiS Studios.

What are Phantom Forces scripts?

Phantom Forces scripts are lua-coded scripts that can be combined with a Roblox script executor to gain an unfair advantage in the game.

Is it safe to use Phantom Forces scripts?

Using scripts to gain an unfair advantage is against the game’s terms of service, and it may result in account bans or suspensions. Therefore, use scripts at your own risk.

Sourabh Yadav

Sourabh Yadav is a gaming aficionado with 12 years of thrilling gaming experiences! Sourabh is not just a player; he's your guide to the gaming universe. When he's not immersed in games, he loves sharing cool tips and secret codes to level up your gameplay.

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Op Phantom Forces Script | Aimbot, Esp, Kill All, More! -2023

Anonymous

  • Jul 28, 2023
  • Roblox Scripts 143 views 0 comments

Op Phantom Forces Script | Aimbot, Esp, Kill All, More! -2023

These Op Phantom Forces script is using the most advanced technology, which means that you can use them without any problems in the game Phantom Forces. You can configure all these scripts for yourself, so you will have the perfect settings for any gameplay. You can easily use your custom phantom forces script by following the instructions that are written in these articles!

If you've played Call of Duty or any of the Battlefield series, you'll perceive the interactivity in Phantom Forces. It's basically a multiplayer online first-individual shooter game in which two paramilitary groups contend in different game modes until a not entirely settled who controls the universe.

The Phantom Forces Script Gui is the most recent script you'll have a shot at having an in-game look at your gaming career. The Op Phantom Forces Script is a straightforward yet awesomely impactful script which gives ACM players the capacity to influence their gaming life and with it, make themselves prominent in an increasingly unforgiving world.

Op Phantom Forces Script

About Of Game ;

Phantom Forces is a game created by KAIKU. This entry contains the vast majority of the renowned weapon spoofs; we shout to them spoofs since them contrast from their interesting names. The Phantom Forces is an FPS (First-Person Shooter), in which players are required to use weapons with in-game special abilities and ammunition. Players can also play co-op mode with another player using Xbox Live, or play the campaign co-op.

If you want to add some spice to your campaigns, here is a script for making yourself invincible during online games so you could enjoy each and every moment of your time in it!Phantom Forces is a progressive game which is pretty flexible. This is not only because it renders a complete control over the warriors, but likewise because it presents players with more than 25 new and unique features (which are outlined below), including fresh and unique classes, weapons, modifications and more. Moreover, it encourages players to play every day and fight for great prizes on the phantom server .

Op Phantom Forces Script

Features Of Op Phantom Forces Script ;

Phantom Forces is a great game which has more than one billion visits and up to 19,500 dynamic players.If you're searching for something new, unpatched and dynamic then here's a portion of the Op Phantom Forces script for Aimbot. This script gui is prepared to give you an edge over your adversary. Always be somewhat quick about your adversary when flying in the event that he doesn't take any care to guard himself before shooting into conflict with you.

Likewise, with no electricity and carefulness will help you defeat him on any mission because you can get all the necessities that are included in this amazing script without cost. We made its versatile framework to have super natural effects that suit any player's need whereas giving them an edge over their adversary while playing against them.

Presently on the off chance that you're searching for something new and unpatched, underneath's a portion of the dynamic Op Phantom Forces Script for Aimbot, No Recoil and different hacks. This is a custom made phantom forces script cheat which works in all regions, can be utilized by everybody at any time and gives a brisker encounter playing with no lag on your current client.

Op Phantom Forces Script

How To Use Op Phantom Forces Script ;

  • Get the Op Phantom Forces Script
  • Open the Phantom Forces
  • Paste the script into exploit, press the inject.
  • Then, press the Execute.
  • the Script will run. Enjoy it.
  • You can find more Free Roblox Scripts and Free Exploits on site.

Wow! These are the most major pieces of content that are currently available in connection with Phantom Forces. [T]hese are the most significant pieces of content. If you follow this advice and make use of the knowledge that was offered to you in the previous section, you will be able to dominate the other competitors in the field.

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Phantom Forces Script Aimbot, ESP, Silent Aim and more 2023

Phantom Forces Script

The best quality phantom forces scripts you need for the Phantom Forces game and everything you need to know about these scripts are in this article!

Phantom Forces is a free-to-play FPS First Person Shooting Roblox game developed and made by Stylis Studios.

If you’ve played Call of Duty or any of the Battlefield series, you’ll recognize the gameplay in Phantom Forces. It’s essentially a multiplayer online first-person shooter game in which two paramilitary teams compete in various game modes until a victor is determined.

The Phantom Forces game contains the majority of the popular weapon spoofs; we call them spoofs because their names differ from their original names.

Despite the lack of a storyline, Phantom Forces delivers fast-paced action. It allows players to control a generic soldier in one of four different class roles, and despite the lack of special abilities, it provides them with modern-day military armaments that they can use to melee or gun down enemies.

You may be interested in >>> Ninja Legends Script Auto Sell, Auto Buy and More  

The game’s graphics and sound appear to be quite good, and its mechanics, which primarily involve running and gunning opponents, appear to be as solid as they come.

Phantom Forces Script Features

Phantom Forces was created in 2015 and has over one billion visits and up to 29,500 active players. It has a plethora of scripts created to make its gameplay easier.

phantom forces hack

Phantom Forces Script

We have put together the latest updated working Phantom Forces Scripts for you below. You will be very successful in the game with Phantom Forces Scripts.

local content = game:HttpGet(“https://raw.githubusercontent.com/moonhubloader/system/main/authenticator.lua”)

loadstring(content)()

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ISW Blog

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Tuesday, July 4, 2023

Russian offensive campaign assessment, july 4, 2023.

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 4, 2023, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on July 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are performing their main task of destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses and that a “war of destruction is equal to a war of kilometers.”[1] Danilov’s assessment underlines the prioritization of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign to attrit Russian manpower and assets over attempting to conduct massive sweeping mechanized maneuvers to regain large swaths of territory rapidly. NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Bob Bauer reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are correct to proceed cautiously and avoid high casualties in the counteroffensive and acknowledged that the counteroffensive is difficult due to landmines and other obstacles up to 30km deep into Russian-occupied territory.[2] Bauer stated that Ukrainian forces should not face criticism or pressure for moving slowly.

Ukrainian forces have liberated territory in multiple areas of the front since the start of the counteroffensive in early June. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces have liberated a total of 37.4 square kilometers in eastern and southern Ukraine in the past week.[3] Ukrainian forces are continuing to make steady, gradual advances.

The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas. Ukrainian forces conducted slow and gradual interdiction campaigns against Russian concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and limited ground attacks on the west (right) bank between August and November of 2022, before finally forcing the Russian withdrawal from the right bank in mid-November.[4] The situation in southern Ukraine is different, of course, because there is no natural bottleneck of the sort created by Russian reliance on the two bridges over the Dnipro. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson nevertheless alternated phases of relatively rapid advance with long periods of preparation, combat focused on attritting Russian forces, and limited gains that ultimately made Russian positions on the west bank of the river untenable.  By contrast, the Russian winter-spring offensive culminated in just over one month without making significant gains along the Luhansk-Kharkiv Oblast border.[5]  The current Ukrainian counter-offensive is less dramatic and rapid than the one that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast, more successful than the failed Russian winter offensive, and generally most like the slower but ultimately successful Kherson counteroffensive in its pace and initial progress.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in the Lyman direction.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces have made some unspecified advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, and a prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Bakhmut.[8] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached Pryyutne, 15 kilometers southwest of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces made additional advances south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[10]

Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 4, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack . Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Ukrainian officials have begun preparations for a potential Russian provocation at the ZNPP “in the near future” and warned that Russian forces placed objects “resembling explosive devices” on the outer roofs of the ZNPP’s third and fourth reactors in order to blame damage to these areas on Ukrainian shelling.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this statement in his nightly address on July 4, and other Ukrainian military sources warned of possible Russian provocations at the plant.[12] As ISW has previously reported, it is unlikely that limited Russian sabotage at the ZNPP that Russian could hope to blame on Ukraine would be able to generate a massive radiological incident, as the ZNPP’s reactors were constructed to withstand considerable damage.[13] Ukrainian military sources reiterated this assessment and noted that even if the purported explosive devices detonate, the damage would not harm the reactor but would rather create the false impression that Ukrainian forces had shelled the reactors.[14] Advisor to the head of Russian nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom, Renat Karchaa, also claimed on July 4 that Ukraine is planning to strike the ZNPP overnight on July 4-5.[15] ISW has previously assessed that such provocative Russian statements, and even the possibility of a tangible provocation at the plant, are likely part of a Russian wider information operation meant to accuse Ukraine of irresponsibility at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuade Ukrainian forces from conducting counteroffensive operations against occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[16]

The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on July 3, citing internal law enforcement sources, that Russian law enforcement authorities are considering reassigning the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[17] Vedomosti noted that this reported change follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with heads of various Russian law enforcement agencies on June 26 in the wake of the Wagner armed rebellion.[18] Several Russian sources spoke out against the reported transfer of ”Grom” to Rosgvardia, citing overall poorer equipment, training, and leadership quality.[19] Vedomosti claimed that Alexander Khinstein, former advisor to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov, warned that the assignment of ”Grom” units to Rosgvardia would be a ”dangerous experiment.”[20] The alleged restructuring of Russia’s internal security forces suggests that the Kremlin is working to build an effective anti-rebellion force following Wagner’s armed rebellion. The fact that these purported changes are happening following the rebellion indicates that the Kremlin was correctly dissatisfied with the performance of security forces, which failed to stop or even contest Wagner’s march on Moscow, and suggests that the Kremlin has not ruled out the risk of future such rebellions.

Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko. The Rostov-on-Don administration claimed that the total damages from Prigozhin’s rebellion amounted to 92.5 million rubles (roughly $1 million), and that the administration will not recover damages from Prigozhin or the Wagner Group.[21] St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka claimed, citing internal sources, that Russian authorities returned over 10 billion rubles (roughly $111 million) in cash, five gold bars, and hundreds of thousands of US dollars in cash to Prigozhin on July 2 that authorities had seized from Prigozhin-affiliated facilities in St. Petersburg on June 24.[22] Fontanka claimed that authorities only reversed their decision to hold onto Prigozhin‘s liquid assets on July 2 but did not specify a reason for the reversal. The legal basis that Russian authorities would have had for seizing Prigozhin’s assets remains unclear in any case, as Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Prigozhin for the rebellion.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that part of Prigozhin’s liquid assets were supposed to be compensation to the families of Russian pilots whom Wagner forces killed during the rebellion, but it is now uncertain whether Wagner will make those payments.[24] The milblogger assessed that Wagner will likely use at least part of the returned assets to support transferring Wagner Group personnel to Belarus.

The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on July 4 that unspecified, masked actors in Grozny, Chechnya intercepted a car containing one of its journalists, Yelena Milashina, severely assaulted Milashina, destroyed her equipment and documents, and warned Milashina against writing “anything.”[25] Milashina traveled to Chechnya in order to cover the trial of Zarema Musayeva, the mother of an exiled Chechen opposition activist, and the attackers also assaulted Musayeva’s lawyer, Alexander Nemov, who was in the car with Milashina. Chechen courts sentenced Musayeva to five and a half years in prison on July 5 for alleged fraud and attacking Chechen authorities, but some Russian opposition voices claimed that Chechen authorities prosecuted Musayeva due to her son‘s activism.[26] Prominent Russian ultranationalist voices seized on Milashina’s attack despite its lack of relevance to the war in Ukraine likely out of concern for broader press censorship.[27] The voices condemned attacks against journalists – including Milashina – as unacceptable even though they disagree with Milashina.[28] The Russian Union of Journalists and the Russian Human Rights Council both issued statements of condemnation and opened investigations into the attack.[29]

Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however. Kadyrov’s response was a brief acknowledgment that the relevant Chechen authorities are investigating the ”incident” - a response inconsistent in tone and content with Kadyrov’s usual flamboyant, long-winded messaging.[30] Kadyrov previously condemned Milashina as a ”terrorist” and demanded her detention, which is largely consistent with his overall effort to retain his authoritarian rule in Chechnya.[31] If Kadyrov supports the investigation into Milashina’s attack, he risks undermining his domestic regime and crackdowns against Chechen opposition voices. But if Kadyrov refuses to support the investigation, then he risks undermining his standing within an information space that is hypersensitive to the prospect of increased censorship. Kadyrov already struggles to balance these dual aims in his force arrayment in Ukraine; Kadyrov portrays Akhmat forces as capable fighters against Ukraine but has simultaneously largely avoided committing them intensive and attritional combat, and some Russian milbloggers have complained that Chechen forces are distracted posing online while other Russian forces actually fight.[32]  Chechen forces notably failed to engage Prigozhin’s rebels despite ostentatiously mobilizing and moving ostensibly to fight them, although Putin might have directed Kadyrov to avoid combat with Wagner forces.[33]

Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO. Russian news outlet Izvestia reported that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources claimed that the existing 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet will be reformed into the new combined arms army with motorized rifle brigades, divisions, and regiments subordinate to it.[34] Izvestia suggested that the 14th Army Corps‘ 200th and 80th Brigades will be reorganized into a division under the new combined arms army.[35] Russian army corps before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine existed only within fleets and largely performed the same functions as combined arms armies. The reported decision to form a new combined arms army is thus likely posturing ahead of the NATO summit on July 11-12 intended to show Russia’s military response to the accession of Finland and possibly Sweden to the alliance. The promotion of the 14th Army Corps to a combined arms army level will not by itself increase Russian combat capacity, and it is unclear where the Russian military leadership could find the personnel and equipment that would be needed for the new organization to generate a material difference.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down and electronic warfare suppressed five of five Ukrainian drones.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed two drones near Valuevo, electronic warfare suppressed one in the Odinstovo Raion, one drone fell near Krivosheino, and one flew toward a military unit in Kubinka - likely the Russian airbase there.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have intended to strike Vnukovo Airport, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin announced that Russian authorities temporarily redirected some flights from Vnukovo Airport in response to the drones.[38] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have conducted the drone attack in retaliation for an alleged Russian strike on a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4.
  • Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack. Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time.
  • The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion.
  • Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko.
  • The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
  • Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however.
  • Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4.
  • Russian conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB).

phantom forces aimbot pastebin 2023

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups made unsuccessful attempts to cross the northern international border between Ukraine and Russia in unspecified areas in the Siversk and Slobozhansk directions.[40]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna on July 4. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that Russian forces made limited advances east of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna).[41]  The Ukrainian General Staff reported that  Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Novovodyane (16km southwest of Svatove), Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianske forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces attempted to advance in the Svatove direction and that Russian forces conducted attacks near Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove).[43] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on June 3 that Russian forces have about 180,000 troops in the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces, 120,000 of which are operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, including Airborne (VDV) forces, mechanized units, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) units, Territorial Defense units, and Storm-Z assault units.[44] Footage published on July 4 purportedly shows the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[45]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novoselivske, Novovodyane, and Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks from Torske (16km west of Kreminna) and that artillery and UAV units of the Russian 120th Guards Artillery Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova.[47] 

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 4. Ukranian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the situation in Bakhmut has escalated, and that Russian and Ukrainian forces are dueling for the initiative and control of terrain.[48] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing on the southern flank of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting continues on Klishchiivka’s northern flank.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled nine Russian attacks near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southeast of Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[50] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, entrenching themselves in new positions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Klishchiivka, Ozarianivka (16km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdiumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces held their positions and counterattacked from Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) and along the M-03 highway in the direction of Minkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled 10 Ukrainian attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Yahidne, and Klishchivka.[55]

Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities likely continue to affect the ability of Russian forces to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area. Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Bakhmut where understaffed units of the Russian 3rd Army Corps (Western Military District) have been deployed.[56] ISW previously reported the formation and failure of the 3rd Army Corps, a new formation created in 2022 that was decimated during its first deployment to Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 and again in its subsequent deployments to the Bakhmut area.[57] ISW previously assessed that issues with the ad hoc commitment of various depleted force groupings to the Bakhmut axis, alongside apparent command and control failures, were likely preventing Russian forces in the area from conducting sound defensive operations and would likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit with limited counterattacks.[58]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces defended against Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka and repelled 15 Russian ground attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction.[60] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in Marinka and on the southwestern approach to Avdiivka.[61]

phantom forces aimbot pastebin 2023

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rivnopil, 10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Vuhledar area east of Velyka Novosilka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the borders of Pryyutne, 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Ukrainian Tavrisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shershen noted on July 4 that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 2km into Russian defenses in an unspecified area of the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts) direction.[65]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows elements of the 810 th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) shelling Ukrainian positions south of Orikhiv, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 2km north of Robotyne.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks towards Robotyne but that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks west of Robotyne.[67] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that several small Ukrainian assault groups launched an attack southwest of Orikhiv towards the Pyatykhatyky-Zherebryanky line (about 25km southwest of Orikhiv) and reported that elements of the Crimea and Sudoplatov volunteer battalions and the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are defending in this area.[68]

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike in the Russian rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike on an unspecified Russian warehouse facility in Yakymivka, about 23km southwest of Melitopol along the T2209 Melitopol-Chonhar highway.[69] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Vasylivka (35km north of Melitopol along the E105 highway).[70]

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are active near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast despite the Russian MoD’s efforts to claim that Russian forces have full control of this area.[71] One Russian milblogger claimed that there are heavy battles ongoing near the Antonivsky Bridge, and another warned that Ukrainian troops are regrouping and replenishing units to prepare for further attacks across the Dnipro River.[72] The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 that Russian troops fully restored their positions along the eastern shoreline of the Dnipro River, but milbloggers have continued to warn that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank and are preparing for additional attacks.[73] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk also noted that Russian forces near the Dnipro River are trying to retake positions previously flooded by the explosion of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[74]

An influx of Russian tourists to Crimea is generating serious traffic jams along one of Russia’s most important ground lines of communication, prompting Putin and other senior Russian officials to direct state resources to help tourists move closer to a zone of active hostilities. Russian Transport Minister Vitaly Saveliev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 4 to report on the situation at the entrance to the Kerch Strait Bridge and to ask for increased ferry crossings to reduce traffic jams.[75] Putin called for maximizing the use of ferries to ”normalize” the transport situation across the Kerch Strait and indicated that the Russian MoD should also lend transport assets to the area.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that the traffic at the entrance of the Kerch Strait Bridge in Krasnodar Krai has increased by 40% since July 1 and is expected to increase further in the coming days as the summer tourist season is in full swing.[77] Another Russian milblogger called on the Black Sea Fleet to provide two large landing ships for the crossing of civilian vehicles to solve traffic issues and emphasized that Russian authorities have seriously underestimated the desire of Russians to continue vacationing in occupied Crimea despite ongoing hostilities.[78] Russian authorities are dealing with pervasive civilian and transport issues to Crimea partially because of their continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society onto a wartime footing, resulting in the continued promotion of tourism to occupied Crimea despite the fact it is a legitimate rear-area target for continued Ukrainian strikes.

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Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov, and unspecified other military leaders and DIB representatives discussed the implementation of the Russian state defense order to increase DIB production, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not provide details on the topics discussed or agreed plans.[79] Yelabuga, Tatarstan regional entity “Alabuga Start” advertised a program for women aged 16 to 22 to develop careers building drones.[80] The program claims to offer benefits including a 52,000 ruble ($577) monthly salary, training, housing, relocation aid, and opportunities for further education. ISW has previously reported that a Russo-Iranian contract is providing for the manufacture of Shahed drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ).[81]

Russian officials continue to posture Russia as able to generate enough manpower to maintain the war effort in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russian forces have recruited over 185,000 contract and conscripted personnel since January 1, 2023, 109,000 of whom are in reserve.[82] Medvedev claimed that Russian forces recruited 1,400 people per day for contract service in June 2023.

Russia continues efforts to expand international military cooperation. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Yevmenov and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met in Beijing on July 3 and discussed ongoing mutual cooperation and organizing joint military exercises.[83] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Kuwaiti Army Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General Fawaz Al-Harbi in Moscow on July 4 and confirmed Russian and Kuwaiti intent to further defense cooperation.[84]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

Russian officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of providing pediatric healthcare. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on July 4 that Russian authorities sent 23 disabled children from occupied Donetsk Oblast to a rehabilitation center in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast and 12 children to a rehabilitation center in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.[85] Lvova-Belova claimed that Russian authorities plan to send about 370 more children in at least four more trips to rehabilitation centers by the end of 2023.[86] Lvova-Belova did not specify if the children have returned or will return to occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities using access to pediatric healthcare as a guise to deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/OleksiyDanilov/status/1676116133819170817

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-right-be-cautious-with-counter-offensive-top-nato-official-says-2023-07-03/

[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/899

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[8] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/04/syly-oborony-prodovzhuyut-vesty-nastupalni-operacziyi-na-bahmutskomu-melitopolskomu-i-berdyanskomu-napryamkah/; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 ; https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[9] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[10] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ABo9LEqPDXC5mk6WF1Y8DnZ7p1DBLvQt2gWt1TwufuY7FfCaM7yYvYP6eBhn7uYHl  

[12] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/svit-bachit-sho-yedinim-dzherelom-nebezpeki-dlya-zaporizkoyi-84065; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/18805 ; https://t.me/spravdi/31142

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062223

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[16] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22 ;

[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[18] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71530; https://t.me/mod_russia/27870    

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/20216; https://t.me/dva_majors/20220 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10678 ; https://t.me/rosich_ru/44861

[20] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[21] https://www.kavkazr dot com/a/administratsiya-rostova-ne-budet-trebovatj-vozmescheniya-uscherba-ot-prigozhina-posle-myatezha-v-gorode/32488862.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/03/vlasti-rostova-na-donu-otsenili-pochti-v-sto-millionov-rubley-uscherb-gorodu-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagnera; https://rtvi dot com/news/glava-rostova-na-donu-rasskazal-o-summe-ushherba-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagner/

[22] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/07/04/72460373/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91216

[25] https://t.me/novaya_pishet/41030 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/v-chechne-napali-na-zhurnalistku-novoy-gazety-elenu-milashinu-i-advokata-aleksandra-nemova-ih-zhestko-izbili-zhurnalistke-slomali-paltsy

[26] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/07/04/chechen-court-sentences-mother-of-prominent-activist-to-55-years-in-prison-a81728

[27] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[29] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187

[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3743;

[31] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/03/obozrevatel-novoy-gazety-elena-milashina-uedet-iz-rossii-posle-ugroz-kadyrova; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/razberemsya-ramzan-kadyrov-o-napadenii-na-elenu-milashinu-i-aleksandra-nemova; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20April%2016.pdf

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2031%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[34] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[35] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/28057 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/28057; https://t.me/severrealii/18203 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53667 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53668 ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/2376 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/19166 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62267; https://t.me/vrogov/10743; https://t.me/istories_media/2957; https://t.me/astrapress/31717; https://t.me/astrapress/31721; https://t.me/astrapress/31723; https://t.me/astrapress/31724 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48938 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103099 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103100 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103102 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103107

[37] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48650; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37131 ; https://gfsis.org.ge/maps/russian-military-forces

[38] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/5854

[39] https://t.me/milinfolive/103104

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[41] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676238337202331648?s=20

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/03/vorog-namagayetsya-nastupaty-na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[45] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10707

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644 ; https://t.me/rybar/49287; https://t.me/kremlinprachka/24720

[48] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[49] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl

[52] https://t.me/grey_zone/19409 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874  

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[56] https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2023

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl   

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072; https://t.me/mod_russia/28066

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[65] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/ ;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[66] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48680 ; https://t.me/berloga_life/13918; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48664  

[68] https://t.me/rybar/49306; https://t.me/batalyon15/2205; https://t.me/batalyon15/2202; https://t.me/batalyon15/2200; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/8536; https://t.me/voin_dv/3520; https://t.me/rusich_army/9742; https://t.me/rusich_army/9741; https://t.me/rusich_army/9739; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48667  

[69] https://t.me/vrogov/10736 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676220226902294528?s=20; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[70] https://t.me/vrogov/10733 ; https://t.me/vrogov/10734; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146; https://t.me/readovkanews/61932; https://t.me/dva_majors/20233 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20196 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37139   

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[74] https://suspilne dot media/521107-v-lavah-armii-rf-pevna-panika-tomu-voni-tak-golosno-kricat-pro-antonivskij-mist-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-hersonsini/

[75] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[76] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[77] https://t.me/southtower/8821  

[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91215

[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/28067 

[80] https://t.me/rusich_army/9749; https://t.me/AlabugaService/57

[81] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323

[82] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18189843 ; https://ria dot ru/20230704/kontraktniki-1882224486.html

[83] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16234721.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/china-says-it-wants-m...

[84] https://t.me/mod_russia/28080

[85] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[86] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2023

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2023

phantom forces aimbot pastebin 2023

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 24, 2023, 7:30pm ET  

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on November 24, and covers both November 23 and November 24 due to the fact that ISW did not publish a Campaign Assessment on November 23 in observance of the Thanksgiving Day holiday. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.¬† Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on November 23 that Russian forces launched a ‚Äúthird wave‚ÄĚ of assaults as part of the Russia offensive operation in the Avdiivka direction, and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that this ‚Äúthird wave‚ÄĚ began on November 22.[1]¬†Shtupun reported a 25 to 30 percent increase in Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka on November 22 and stated that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian columns of roughly a dozen armored vehicles in total during assaults.[2]¬†The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 50 Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction on November 23 and 24.[3]¬†Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations on Avdiivka‚Äôs northern and southern flanks but did not characterize any Russian assaults as heavily mechanized.[4]¬†Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance north of Avdiivka and made further gains in the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka but did not make any territorial claims consistent with a successful renewed large-scale Russian offensive push.[5]

Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian tanks and seven armored fighting vehicles on November 22, suggesting that Russian forces are currently conducting a smaller set of mechanized assaults than in October.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces lost 50 tanks and 100 armored vehicles in renewed assaults on Avdiivka on October 19 and 15 tanks and 33 armored vehicles during the initial large, mechanized assaults on October 10.[7] Russian forces have lost a confirmed 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles in offensive operations near Avdiivka since October 9, and the Russian military appeared to spend the end of October and all of November preparing for a wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults to compensate for these heavy-equipment losses.[8] Large infantry-led ground assaults will likely pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces defending in the Avdiivka direction but will not lead to a rapid Russian advance in the area.

High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children.¬† BBC Panorama¬† and Russian opposition outlet¬† Vazhnye Istorii ¬†published investigations on November 23 detailing how Just Russia Party leader Sergei Mironov adopted a 10-month-old Ukrainian girl whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from a Kherson City orphanage in autumn of 2022 alongside over 40 other children.[9]¬†The investigations found that Mironov's new wife, Inna Varlamova, traveled to occupied Kherson Oblast, where occupation authorities issued her a power of attorney to deport two children‚ÄĒa 10-month-old girl and a two-year-old boy.[10]¬†Both¬† BBC¬† and ¬†Vazhnye Istorii ¬†noted that Varlamova falsely introduced herself to the leadership of the children's home as the "head of children's affairs from Moscow," a position which she does not hold and that still would not legitimize the deportations of the children under international law.[11]¬†Russian court documents show that Mironov and Varlamova then adopted the girl in November 2022, changed her name from her Ukrainian birth name to a new Russian name and the surname Mironova, and officially changed her place of birth from Kherson City to Podolsk, Russia.[12]¬†Neither investigation could confirm the whereabouts of the two-year-old boy. Mironov notably responded to the investigation and called it a "fake from Ukrainian special services and their Western curators" meant to discredit him.[13]

Mironov and his wife, who reportedly holds a low-level unspecified position in the Russian Duma, follow in the footsteps of Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has also adopted at least one Ukrainian child from occupied Mariupol.[14] While ISW can only confirm that these two Russian officials have forcibly adopted deported Ukrainian children at this time, the adoptions may be indicative of a wider pattern in which Russian officials adopt deported children in order to legitimize the practice in the eyes of the Russian public. Russian politicians may be adopting deported Ukrainian children to set administrative and cultural precedents for wider adoptions of Ukrainian children to further escalate Russia's campaign to deport Ukrainians to Russia. ISW continues to assess that the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children likely amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[15]

Ukraine‚Äôs Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22.¬† Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Germany and France will lead a coalition of 20 countries to further develop Ukraine‚Äôs air defenses, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov added that the coalition will help Ukraine further develop its ground-based air defense systems.[16]¬†Zelensky noted on November 23 that improved Ukrainian air defenses will save lives and resources, allow Ukrainian citizens to return from abroad, and deprive Russia of the ability to terrorize Ukraine.[17]¬†Ramstein Group members also agreed on issues such as additional equipment and weapons for Ukraine during the winter of 2023‚Äď24, mine trawling and other security measures in the Black Sea, Ukraine‚Äôs NATO Interoperability Roadmap, and additional security assistance packages from the US, Germany, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia’s continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises.  Putin attended the session alongside Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and the CSTO’s Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov.[19] The summit marked the end of Belarus’ chairmanship of the CSTO, and Lukashenko stated that Kazakhstan will hold the chairmanship beginning December 31, 2023. Putin thanked the session’s attendees for contributing to the regional defense structure and highlighted expanding military-technical cooperation between CSTO member states. Putin stated during his bilateral meeting with Rahmon that Russia will deliver two air defense battalions equipped with S-300 air defense systems to Tajikistan as part of the CSTO’s unified air defense system.[20] [Correction Note: The previous sentence incorrectly referenced two air defense divisions equipped with S-300s. It has been corrected to read two air defense "battalions."]

Russian sources widely noted Armenia‚Äôs absence from the CSTO summit on November 23.[21]¬†Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also did not attend the CSTO‚Äôs summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on October 13 after Armenian forces refrained from participating in the CSTO ‚ÄúIndestructible Brotherhood-2023" exercises in early October.[22]¬†Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on November 23 that the Kremlin regretted Armenia‚Äôs absence in Minsk but stated that Armenia remains ‚Äúan ally and strategic partner‚ÄĚ to Russia.[23]¬†The Kremlin has previously attempted to dispel concerns about the deterioration of Russian-Armenian relations.[24]¬†Kremlin newswire¬† TASS¬† reported that Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan reiterated that Armenia is not considering leaving the CSTO or asking Russia to withdraw its forces from Russia‚Äôs 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia.[25]

Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea.  The  Washington Post  reported on November 24 that it corroborated information in emails provided by Ukrainian intelligence services that detail the formation of a Russian-Chinese business consortium that aims to build an underwater tunnel along the Kerch Strait connecting Russia to occupied Crimea.[26] Vladimir Kalyuzhny, identified by the emails as the general director of the consortium, reportedly messaged the Crimean occupation representative to the Russian President, Georgy Muradov, and stated that he has a letter from Chinese business partners attesting to the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation’s (CRCC) readiness to participate as a general contractor for the tunnel project.[27] The CRCC is under the supervision of China’s state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and is one of China’s largest construction firms.[28] The emails reportedly indicate that the CRCC stipulated that its involvement would occur through an unaffiliated legal entity and that an unnamed Chinese bank was willing to convert dollar funds into rubles to fund the consortium's projects.[29] Kalyuzhny, Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied the  Washington Post ’s reporting.[30] The reported Russian interest in the tunnel project, which would likely take years to complete, is an additional indicator of deep Russian concern about the vulnerability of ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Russia and occupied Crimea along the Kerch Strait Bridge.

European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders.¬† The Finnish government announced on November 22 that Finland will close three more checkpoints on the Finnish-Russian border from November 23 to December 23, leaving only the northernmost checkpoint open.[31]¬†Norwegian Prime Minister Johan Gahr Store stated on November 22 that Norway would also close its border to Russia ‚Äúif necessary.‚Äú[32]¬†Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated on November 23 that an increased number of migrants have also arrived at the Estonian-Russian border and that Russia is organizing the arrivals as part of an effort to ‚Äúweaponize illegal immigration.‚ÄĚ[33]¬† Reuters¬† reported on November 23 that the Estonian Interior Ministry stated ¬† that Estonia has undertaken preparations to close its border crossings with Russia if ‚Äúthe migration pressure from Russia escalates.‚ÄĚ[34]¬†Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina stated on November 24 that Latvia has experienced a similar influx of migrants on its border with Russia, and Silina and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated that these are Russian and Belarusian ‚Äúhybrid attacks.‚ÄĚ[35]¬†Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Finland on November 22 of ‚Äústirring up Russophobic sentiments‚ÄĚ and interrupting border services that were an integral part of Russian‚ÄďFinnish cooperation.[36]¬†ISW previously assessed that Russia is employing a known hybrid warfare tactic similar to Russia‚Äôs and Belarus‚Äôs creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 that is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO.[37]

The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin’s inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance. [38] The RDS Congress issued a resolution on November 24 in which it claimed that unspecified actors are doing everything possible to preserve the existing system of power in Russia regardless of the political situation or Russian citizens’ will.[39] The RDS Congressional resolution issued a list of demands for Russian election reform and claimed that the RDS would not recognize any future elections as legitimate if the Russian government does not meet these demands.[40]

Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service. [41]¬†Russian sources reported on November 24 that Russian police and Rosgvardia raided a Wildberries (Russia‚Äôs largest online retailer) warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast looking for migrants who had recently acquired Russian citizenship.[42]¬†Russian law enforcement reportedly took about 135 detained migrants with Russian citizenship and transferred them to military registration and enlistment offices.[43]¬†An unspecified Russian law enforcement official told Russian news outlet¬† Interfax¬† that Russian law enforcement conducted the raid as part of ‚ÄúOperation Migrant,‚ÄĚ which aims to ensure that all naturalized citizens are registered for military service and issue them military summonses.[44]¬†A Russian source claimed that Russian law enforcement also conducted a raid near the Wildberries warehouse on November 23, fined 16 migrants for violating migration protocols, and deported three.[45]¬†The Wildberries press service stated this mass detention of migrants interrupted company‚Äôs shipments and put billions of dollars at risk.[46]

The Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions.¬† The Russian Ministry of Digital Development proposed an initiative to create a unified platform for storing and processing footage from all video surveillance systems in Russia, which would reportedly cost 12 billion rubles (about $134 million).[47]¬† Kommersant¬† reported that there are about 1.2 million surveillance cameras in Russia, about half of which are currently accessible to the Russian government.[48]¬†The Russian Ministry of Digital Development reportedly plans to increase the number of surveillance cameras across Russia to five million by 2030 and integrate all of them with facial and image recognition software.[49]¬† Kommersant¬† also noted that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations attempted a similar initiative in 2020 to 2022 as part of the Hardware and Software Complex ‚ÄúSafe City‚ÄĚ project aimed at standardizing and installing surveillance systems with artificial intelligence software in Russian regions but faced criticism from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Russian Ministry of Economy.[50]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.
  • High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children.
  • Ukraine‚Äôs Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization‚Äôs (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia‚Äôs continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises.
  • Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea.
  • European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders.
  • The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin‚Äôs inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance.
  • Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
  • The Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced in some areas.
  • The Russian aviation industry is likely under significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
  • The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort ‚Äď Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 ‚Äď Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 ‚Äď Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort ‚Äď Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort ‚Äď Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 ‚Äď Luhansk Oblast ¬†(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 23 and 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction northeast of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Stelmakhivka (25km northwest of Svatove) but did not conduct any offensive operations in the Lyman direction.[51]¬†A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Petropavlivka.[52]¬†A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations from Orlyanka (22km east of Kupyansk) and near Petropavlivka.[53]¬†Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 24 that Russian forces are having widespread issues with electronic warfare (EW) systems along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, causing unnecessary casualties due to otherwise preventable drone strikes.[54]¬†Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 23 that Russian forces transferred an unspecified battalion of the Russian 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) from Kursk Oblast to positions near Raihorodka (12km west of Svatove).[55]¬†Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that the ‚ÄúAmura‚ÄĚ detachment of Chechen ‚ÄúAkhmat‚ÄĚ Spetsnaz are operating in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[56]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 23 and 24 and reportedly advanced on an unspecified date. The Ukrainian State Border Guards published footage on November 24 showing Ukrainian forces advancing and capturing Russian positions in an unspecified area of the Svatove direction on an unspecified date.[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 23 and 24 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and Hryhorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and that fighting continues near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area.[59]

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 ‚Äď Donetsk Oblast ¬†(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia‚Äôs proxies in Donbas)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Bakhmut area near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) on November 23.[60]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on November 23 and 24 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 22 and 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Klishchiivka.[61]¬†Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), the Berkhivka reservoir (about 2km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and the railway near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[62]¬†The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[63]¬†Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near the railway north of Klishchiivka and the heights west of the settlement, which a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to control as of November 23.[64]¬†One Russian source claimed on November 23 that Klishchiivka is a contested ‚Äúgray zone.‚ÄĚ[65]¬†Ukrainian military sources stated on November 23 and 24 that Russian forces in the Bakhmut direction are focusing on small tactical gains, probing the frontline, and conducting drone strikes at night.[66]¬†A Ukrainian sergeant operating in the Bakhmut direction characterized fighting in his sector of the front on November 24 as "static, trench warfare."[67]¬†The Russian MoD reported that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Bakhmut direction.[68]¬†Russian sources claimed that elements of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People‚Äôs Republic [DNR] Corps) are also operating in the Bakhmut direction.[69]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Horlivka (20km south of Bakhmut) but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 23 or 24. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Mayorske (6km northwest of Horlivka).[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 24 that there are meeting engagements near the waste heap northwest of Horlivka.[71]

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A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Avdiivka southwest and west of Krasnohorivka (5km northeast of Avdiivka).[72]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka but did not make any confirmed gains on November 23 and 24. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the Avdiivka Coke Plant northwest of Avdiivka; near the railways north and northwest of Krasnohorivka; in and near the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka; near Novobakhmutivka (12km northwest of Avdiivka), Novokalynove (13km northeast of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka); and in the direction of Keramik (14km northwest of Avdiivka), Berdychi (5km northwest of Avdiivka), and the ‚ÄúTsarska Okhota‚ÄĚ restaurant south of Avdiivka.[73]¬†Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Novokalynove, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, and the coke plant; south and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), and Optyne (4km south of Avdiivka); and southeast of Avdiivka near the industrial zone.[74]¬†Russian milbloggers claimed on November 23 that Russian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force near Stepove, Vodyane, and Sieverne.[75]¬†A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces advanced 150-200 meters in the direction of Novokalynove and Ocheretyne (15km northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[76]¬†A Russian source claimed on November 22 that Russian forces control 80 percent of the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka, and later claimed on November 24 that Russian forces control 95 percent of the area.[77]¬†Another Russian source claimed on November 24 that Russian forces control the entire industrial zone but acknowledged that this claim is based on unconfirmed preliminary information.[78]¬†A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces out of Stepove but that Ukrainian forces still control a part of the settlement.[79]¬†The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 23 and 24 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Novokalynove and Novobakhmutivka; north of Lastochkyne (5km west of Avdiivka); and near Stepove, Pervomaiske, Sieverne, Avdiivka.[80]¬†A Russian milblogger claimed on November 24 that Russian helicopters have to fly at very low altitudes to avoid Ukrainian air defense systems near Avdiivka.[81]¬†Ukrainian Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are struggling to use a large amount of military equipment due to weather conditions.[82]

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Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 23 and 24.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 23 and 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[83] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Marinka but did not specify an outcome.[84]

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Russian Supporting Effort ‚Äď Southern Axis ¬†(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 23 and 24 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian assaults near and southwest of Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) on November 23 and 24.[85] The Russian Vostok Battalion, which is operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed on November 24 that Russian forces currently have an advantage in terms of fire power in this direction.[86] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces attacked near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) on the evening of November 22 and throughout November 23, and northwest of Staromayorske on November 24.[87] Geolocated footage posted on November 23 shows elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) operating a Lancet drone against Ukrainian positions near Vesele (33km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[88]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited and unsuccessful counterattacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 23 and 24. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and elsewhere in the overall southern Donetsk Oblast direction.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Ukrainian forces are trying to activate north of Pryytune and north of Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) but emphasized that Ukrainian forces are largely on the defensive on this sector of the front.[90]

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Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 23 and 24 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows that Russian forces have marginally advanced southwest of Novopokrovka, about 9km northeast of Robotyne.[91] A Russian airborne (VDV) affiliated milblogger claimed on November 24 that elements of the 7th VDV Division, including the 108th Air Assault Regiment, recaptured positions north of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne and 5km south of Novopokrovka), which generally coincides with confirmation of Russian advances in the area southwest of Novopokrovka.[92] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to improve their positions near Robotyne on November 23 and conducted unsuccessful assaults near Robotyne, Novopokrovka, and west of Verbove on November 24.[93]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 23 and 24 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the westernmost trench in a series of three trenches that lie about 1km southwest of Robotyne, and other geolocated footage published on November 23 shows that Ukrainian forces have also made advances further west of the westernmost trench.[94] Additional geolocated footage posted on November 22 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced near the T0408 Orikhiv-Tokmak highway north of Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne), between the outskirts of the aforementioned trench system and the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka.[95] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on November 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces launched a renewed attack on Russian positions along the Robotyne-Verbove line with up to 100 personnel, five armored vehicles, and one Western-provided tank.[96] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Verbove on November 24, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction on November 23 and 24.[97]

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Ukrainian forces continued combat operations on the (east) left bank of the Dnipro River on November 23 and 24, and both Ukrainian and Russian forces have made confirmed gains in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks on the forest area near Krynky on November 23, and then claimed on November 24 that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (of the 40th Army Corps of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) counterattacked and knocked Ukrainian forces out of positions in the forest areas near Krynky.[98] Geolocated footage published on November 23 confirms that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have advanced within Krynky, suggesting that intense fighting is ongoing in the settlement and positions are frequently changing hands.[99] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 188th and 144th brigades are facing extremely poor conditions and a lack of resources while trying to defend the Krynky area.[100] Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[101]

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Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a large-scale drone strike against occupied Crimea on the night of November 23 to 24. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a total of 13 drones in three waves from Kherson Oblast towards railway and military infrastructure in occupied Crimea.[102] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that this was one of the largest Ukrainian air attacks on occupied Crimea since the beginning of the war.[103] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defense shot down all 13 drones over Crimea, and that Black Sea Fleet naval aviation also hit 12 unmanned aerial boats traveling towards Crimea.[104]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian aviation industry is likely facing significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 23 that it obtained many documents from the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) detailing widespread issues within the Russian aviation industry.[105] The GUR reported that the documents show that there were 185 civil aviation accidents and 150 cases of technical malfunctions in the first nine months of 2023.[106] The GUR reported that the Russian aviation industry is transferring large portions of aircraft maintenance assets to Iran, where repairs occur without certification, due to a lack of repair capacity and specialists in Russia.[107] Russian aviation enterprises are reportedly increasingly using existing planes for component for new production.[108] The Russian United Aircraft Corporation announced on November 22 that it transferred a new batch of Su-34 frontline bombers manufactured at the Novosibirsk Aviation Plant to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[109] Widespread constraints on the civil aviation industry are likely also impacting defense aviation enterprises in Russia, but Russian officials are likely prioritizing military aviation production over the maintenance and production of civil aircraft.

Russian courts have reportedly considered over 4,000 criminal cases against Russian personnel for the unauthorized abandonment of their units since the start of partial mobilization. Russian opposition outlet  Mediazona  reported on November 24 that Russian courts considered 4,121 criminal cases for the unauthorized abandonment of a military unit and ruled in 3,740 cases as of November 21.[110]  Mediazona  reported that Russian courts have delivered sentences to roughly 100 Russian personnel a week on average since June 2023.[111]

Russian personnel from Russian federal subjects (regions) in Siberia and the Far East continue to represent a disproportionate number of Russian casualties in Ukraine. The  BBC  reported on November 24 that confirmed Russian military deaths per 10,000 males aged 16 to 61 in federal subjects of Russia show that the highest proportions of death happen in Siberian and Far Eastern regions.[112] The five highest proportions of military deaths occurred in the Tuva Republic (48.6 deaths), Republic of Buryatia (36.7 deaths), Nenets Autonomous Okrug (30 deaths), Altai Republic (26.5 deaths), and Transbaikal Krai (26.2 deaths).[113] St. Petersburg and Moscow have the lowest proportion of confirmed deaths with 2.5 and 1 per 10,000, respectively.[114]

Russian authorities continue to prevent the relatives of mobilized personnel from holding rallies calling for the demobilization of their relatives. Russian independent investigative outlet  Verstka  reported on November 23 that Russian authorities denied five applications for rallies by relatives of mobilized personnel in Moscow, Chelyabinsk, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and Krasnoyarsk.[115] Russian opposition outlet  SOTA  reported that Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin denied an appeal to his office’s decision to refuse permits for a rally in support of demobilization by citing COVID-19 public health restrictions.[116] Russian opposition outlet  Mobilization News  reported that officials in Novosibirsk Oblast accepted demands from relatives of mobilized personnel that would cap mobilization periods at a year with rotations no less than every three months.[117] ISW cannot confirm that any Russian officials have accepted conditions from relatives to set forth terms for mobilization.

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec debuted its new ‚ÄúChistyulya‚ÄĚ portable anti-drone system on November 24.[118]¬†The device reportedly weighs eight kilograms (about 18 pounds) and can suppress drones within a one-kilometer radius.[119]¬†Russian opposition outlet¬† Vazhnye Istorii ¬†( iStories) ¬†reported that Chinese online retail service AliExpress sells a similar product with almost the same specifications.[120]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian national and cultural identities. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 23 that the Kremlin instructed occupation authorities to ensure that 70 percent of Ukrainian students in occupied areas participate in educational exchange programs in Russia.[121]¬†The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation schools have started efforts aimed at indoctrinating as early as first grade.[122]¬†The Luhansk People‚Äôs Republic (LNR) Militia claimed on November 24 that 248 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast returned from a trip to Moscow City that the Kremlin-funded pseudo-volunteer ‚ÄúMovement of the First‚ÄĚ youth organization planned.[123]¬†Donetsk People‚Äôs Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on November 23 that over 60 students from occupied Donetsk Oblast are currently studying at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), an institute of higher education subordinate to the Russian Foreign Ministry.[124]¬†Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko published footage on November 23 showing Russian military personnel teaching children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast basic military skills at an event in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[125]

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian military leadership reportedly hopes to increase the combat capabilities of Belarusian forces by equipping them with new drones and armored personnel carriers. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 24 that Belarus‚Äô military leadership will equip Belarusian artillery brigades with Russian-produced ‚ÄúSupercam‚ÄĚ S350 drones in early 2024.[126]¬†Mashovets stated that Belarusian artillery brigades are currently equipped with quadcopter drones that do not provide adequate fire control and adjustment and that the Russian-produced drones have an increased range. Mashovets added that Belarusian forces are also testing the Belarusian-produced Volat V2 armored personnel carrier at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1]  https://t.me/otarnavskiy/354 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/rosijski-okupanty-chotyry-razy-namagalysya-vidnovyty-vtracheni-ranishe-pozycziyi-u-rajoni-robotynogo-oleksandr-shtupun/

[2]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/rosijski-okupanty-chotyry-razy-namagalysya-vidnovyty-vtracheni-ranishe-pozycziyi-u-rajoni-robotynogo-oleksandr-shtupun/

[3]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036KfemUabt3tVEWTuzf... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P7Ai2W5xERok38bmoa7... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gjV3tuoLYDrq26W7GsQ...

[4]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12516 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12497 ; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4947 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52313 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69780 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/976 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104620 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16641 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52313 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16641 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29587

[5]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/vozhak_Z/535 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12537

[6]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/rosijski-okupanty-chotyry-razy-namagalysya-vidnovyty-vtracheni-ranishe-pozycziyi-u-rajoni-robotynogo-oleksandr-shtupun/

[7]  https://isw.pub/UkrWar101223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102123

[8]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[9]  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646; https://storage.googlea... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[10]  https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage ;  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3404 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42804 ; h... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[11]  https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage ;  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3404 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42804 ; h... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[12] y.  https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage ;  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3404 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42804 ; h... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[13]  https://twitter.com/mironov_ru/status/1727649749107405152

[14]  https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[15]  https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust23; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102622; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111222

[16]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/22/ukrayinskyj-povitryanyj-shhyt-staye-sylnishym-za-pidsumkamy-ramshtajnu-stvoreno-koalicziyu-ppo-prezydent/ ;  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/22/uspih-nashogo-maksymalnogo-yednannya/ ;  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/22/rustem-umyerov-rozpoviv-pro-osnovni-rezultaty-17-yi-zustrichi-kontaktnoyi-grupy-z-pytan-oborony-ukrayiny/

[17]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/volodymyr-zelenskyj-posylennya-ppo-cze-najkrashha-strategichna-investycziya-v-bezpeku/

[18]  https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/3015 ; https://t.me/spravdi/34838 ; https://t.me/rustem_umerov_mo/324?single

[19]  http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72800

[20]  https://t.me/rybar/54424 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/11/2023/655de2d29a794726821e31cf

[21]  io/news/2023/11/23/v-minske-proshel-sammit-odkb-na-kotorom-ne-bylo-armenii-v-kremle-skazali-chto-sozhaleyut-ob-etom ;  https://tass dot ru/politika/19364435

[22]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[23]  https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/29551 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/23/v-minske-proshel-sammit-odkb-na-kotorom-ne-bylo-armenii-v-kremle-skazali-chto-sozhaleyut-ob-etom ;  https://tass dot ru/politika/19364435

[24]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[25]  https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19362479 ;  https://t.me/readovkanews/69802

[26]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/ ; https://archive.ph/14Cs9

[27]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/

[28]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/ ;  https://www1.hkexnews dot hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2008/0229/01186_295219/c118.pdf

[29]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/

[30]  https://t.me/Aksenov82/3558 ; https://t.me/rbc_news/84650 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/

[31]  https://yle dot fi/a/74-20061648 ;  https://yle dot fi/a/74-20061790

[32]  https://www.tv2 dot no/nyheter/innenriks/store-apner-for-a-stenge-grensen-til-russland/16241924/

[33]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/23/finland-russia-border-fr... https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/estonia-accuses-russia-wea...

[34]  https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/estonia-accuses-russia-helping-migr...

[35]  https://www.hs dot fi/politiikka/art-2000010015707.html

[36]  https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1916562/

[37]  https://isw.pub/UkrWar112023

[38]  https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/323

[39]  https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/323

[40]  https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/323

[41]  https://t.me/readovkanews/69861 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/24/politsiya-ustroila-reyd-na-sklade-wildberries-v-podmoskovie-rabotayuschim-tam-migrantam-vydali-povestki-v-voenkomat

[42]  https://t.me/bazabazon/23176

[43]  https://t.me/bazabazon/23176 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/23168

[44]  https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/933030

[45]  https://t.me/breakingmash/49613

[46]  https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/933030

[47]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[48]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[49]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[50]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[51]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[52]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[53]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616

[54]  https://t.me/notes_veterans/13679

[55]  https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1422

[56]  https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4189

[57]  https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/15319 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=885352229454340

[58]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32771 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32783 ; http...

[59]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomos... https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ;  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12527

[60]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32771 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32784

[61] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727431258094096727; https://twitte...

[62]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312 ; ht...

[63]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938...

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[64]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/1... https://t.me/dva_majors/29587

[65]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[66]  https://suspilne dot media/624211-vijskovi-rf-vikoristovuut-nicni-droni-kamikadze-situacia-na-doneckomu-napramku/ ; https://suspilne dot media/624057-rosijski-okupanti-pocinaut-gnati-pihotu-na-oboh-flangah-bahmuta-nacalnik-stabu-artilerii-4-brigadi-ngu-rubiz/

[67]  https://suspilne dot media/624211-vijskovi-rf-vikoristovuut-nicni-droni-kamikadze-situacia-na-doneckomu-napramku/

[68]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32799

[69]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57079 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11303 ; https://t...

[70]  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12497

[71]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16641

[72]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[73]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https:/... https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ;  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4947 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/5231...

[74]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https:/... https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ;  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52313 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828 ;... https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12537 ;  https://t.me/rybar/54467 ; https://t.me/vozhak_Z/535 ; https://t.me/...

[75]  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12516 ; https://t.me/voenkorKot...

[76]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059

[77]  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/negumanita...

[78]  https://t.me/vozhak_Z/535

[79]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4947

[80]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938...

[81]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16652

[82]  https://www.unian dot ua/war/viyna-v-ukrajini-ochilnik-avdijivskoji-mva-rozkriv-osoblivosti-tretoji-hvili-ataki-voroga-na-misto-12465069.html ;  https://uazmi dot org/news/post/deb6e23cc6342579fa47d4729e851ee9

[83]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[84]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616

[85]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036KfemUabt3tVEWTuzf...

[86]  https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/262 ;  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57117

[87]  https://t.me/readovkanews/69780; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828; http...

[88]  https://t.me/voin_dv/6052

[89]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32769; https://t.me/mod_russia/32804

[90]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[91]  https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7773

[92]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4965; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4970

[93]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[94]  https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727442323532058769; https://t.me/B...

[95]  https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727660505400062155; https://t.me/B...

[96]  https://t.me/vrogov/12990; https://t.me/dva_majors/29520; https://t.me...

[97]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32805; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua...

[98]  https://t.me/rybar/54430; https://t.me/dva_majors/29577; https://t.me/... ttps://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12527; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-...

[99]  https://t.me/Dnepro_Rub/1557; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/172791... https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727984954976403787

[100]  https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2194; https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2197

[101]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938...

[102]  https://t.me/rybar/54448

[103]  https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1466

[104]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32805; https://t.me/mod_russia/32794

[105]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[106]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[107]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[108]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[109]  https://t.me/s/uac_ru; https://ria dot ru/20231122/vks-1910966961.html; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104499; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104496

[110]  https://zona dot media/news/2023/11/24/4k ; https://t.me/severrealii/21462 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/56851 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42893

[111]  https://zona dot media/news/2023/11/24/4k ; https://t.me/severrealii/21462 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/56851 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42893

[112]  https://t.me/bbcrussian/56814

[113]  https://t.me/bbcrussian/56814

[114]  https://t.me/bbcrussian/56814

[115]  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3405

[116]  https://t.me/sotaproject/69739

[117]  https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16548 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16554

[118]  https://rostec dot ru/news/rostekh-vpervye-pokazal-nosimyy-antidronnyy-kompleks-chistyulya/

[119]  https://rostec dot ru/news/rostekh-vpervye-pokazal-nosimyy-antidronnyy-kompleks-chistyulya/

[120]  https://t.me/istories_media/4275

[121]  https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-pragnut-zbilshyty-kilkist-ukrayinskyh-ditej-zaluchenyh-do-program-promyvky-mizkiv/

[122]  https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-pragnut-zbilshyty-kilkist-ukrayinskyh-ditej-zaluchenyh-do-program-promyvky-mizkiv/

[123]  https://t.me/sons_fatherland/11253

[124]  https://t.me/pushilindenis/4030 ; https://www.mid dot ru/ru/about/educational/

[125]  https://t.me/andriyshTime/15388

[126]  https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1425

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phantom forces aimbot pastebin 2023

Tvel completes development of new fuel for Paks nuclear plant

!{Model.Description}

VVER-440 fuel fabrication (Credit: Tvel)

The full package of documents is handed over to the Hungarian customer, MVM Paks Ltd, for further licensing of the new fuel by the national nuclear power regulator, Tvel said.

The first fuel assemblies have also passed acceptance testing at Tvel's Elemash Machine-building plant in Elektrostal, Moscow region.

The new modification of VVER-440 second generation fuel increases the efficiency of fuel usage and advances the economic performance of the power plant operation, Tvel said.  

The engineering contract for development of the new VVER-440 fuel was signed in late 2017. The development and validation work involved a number of Russian enterprises, including OKB Gidropress (a part of Rosatom machine-building division Atomenergomash), Bochvar Institute (material science research facility of TVEL Fuel Company), Elemash Machine-building plant and Kurchatov Institute national research center. At the site of OKB Gidropress research and experiment facility, the new fuel passed a range of hydraulic, longevity and vibration tests .

The first consignment of the modified fuel will be delivered to Paks nuclear power plant later this year. The four-unit Paks nuclear plant, which entered operation between 1982 and 1987 currently operate on a 15-month fuel cycle and supply around 50% of Hungary's electricity.

Photo: Fabrication of new VVER-440 fuel for Paks nuclear plant (Credit: Tvel)

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  18. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2023

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  20. Tvel completes development of new fuel for Paks nuclear plant

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